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So-called "rational motivation theories" 1 in metaethics constitute an 
interesting and varied category. "Examples. . .are ideal-observer and 
qualified-attitude theories and certain versions of contractarianism -
cognitivist theories which give an account of moral truth in terms of a class 
of rationally constrained motivational responses." 2 Indeed, the scope of 
such theories is often far broader than "moral truth" per se, and may 
include explicat ions of overriding normative judgments , essential 
requirements of practical rationality, the concept of value (taken in its 
strongest sense) and a host of longstanding metaethical problems. 
A somewhat neglected and ontologically austere subcategory of 
rational motivation theory is what I call "cognitive naturalism." My aim is 
to examine this type of account, certain of its basic themes and supporting 
arguments, by considering in some detail one version of it. 
1 
The basic idea behind cognitive naturalism is that normative and 
evaluative truth are in some way constituted by the fact that one or more 
agents would choose to perform an action or respond positively toward a 
thing were they adequately informed about it. Cognitive naturalist (or CN) 
theories are "naturalist ic" because they make no basic ontological 
commitments to entities that do not already figure in currently well-
confirmed scientific theories or commonsense views about the material 
world (with reasonable priority being given to the former in cases of 
genuine ontological conflict) . The point here is that ethics has no 
distinctive or sui generis ontology of its own, perhaps, as we shall sec, with 
the limited exception of projections of and from familiar psychological 
processes that occur every day. Correlatively, such accounts purport to be 
thoroughly reductivist in just this respect: no concept or expression 
employed in the analyses provided, nor indeed any complex component 
in them, is by itself "normative" or "evaluative" in some strong sense. 
Rather, that certain facts and propositions have these characteristics is a 
function of the entire combination of elements in the theory's analyses. 
CN accounts purport to give analyses, or at least "real definitions," of 
f o l l o w i n g David Zimmerman's terminology in "Meta-Ethics Naturalized," 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy X (1980), pp. 637-662, at p. 652. 
2 lbid., pp. 651-652. 
Auslcgung, Vol 15, No. 2 
116 A U S L E C U N G 
normative and evaluative notions in terms of truth conditions, 3 and are 
"realist" in (at least) two senses. First, the truth or falsity of propositions 
applying these concepts is logically independent of the beliefs of agents 
regarding those same propositions. Second, normative and evaluative 
concepts are not guaranteed to hold of an object owing to the result of any 
determinable and finite verification procedure. 4 
CN theories are also constrained, whatever their details, by two 
general principles. The first is the Principle of Normative Motivational 
Neutrality, or NMN: 
No logically consistent desire, aim, or preference can be shown to be 
normatively unjustified, relative to an agent at a given time, solely on 
the basis of its causal origin in him or owing to the facts about its 
object that are independent of the effect on his motivation of his 
representation and consideration of them. 
The second is the Principle of Necessary Practical Relevance of (true) 
normative and evaluative judgments, or NPR: 
True normative and evaluative judgments which are valid relative to 
an agent have a practical or motivational relevance for him which is 
noncontingent. 
Under NMN, it is at least conceivable that any internally consistent desire 
or preference might turn out to be rationally justified and hence to give 
rise to actions that would be, in the strongest sense, normatively justified 
relative to the agent in question. Under NPR, whatever kind of fact is 
essentially involved in the truth of a normative or evaluative judgment, 
that such a fact obtains necessarily implicates the motivational capacities 
'By a "real definition" 1 simply mean an analysis indicating that feature or 
fact in reality which most closely corresponds to conditions implicit in the 
pre theoretical concept at issue. Such analyses may have greater logical 
and theoretical detail than, but conform enough in content to, the pre-
theoretic notion for us to say that factual and property reference is 
preserved. Sometimes, of course, they can't be. Thus, the closest thing in 
reality corresponding to the notion of demonic possession is, I suppose, 
schizophrenic psychosis, but the correspondence is just not close enough. 
Instances of the latter do not count as cases of demonic possession. What 
accounts for this is probably the fact that the ontology of the required 
causal origin of possession is completely absent in the corresponding 
psychological notion. 
^Whether and in what sense there are "objective" values and normative 
requirements we shall consider later on. See section 5, infra. 
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of agents for whom and relative to whom the content of the judgment is in 
fact normative or evaluative. 
T h e gambit of the cognitive naturalist is to attempt to account for 
normative validity in terms of its connection with motivation, provided that 
he can also specify, reductively, conditions under which motivation is 
maximally subject to rational qualification and criticism. Given, however, 
the cognitivist and reductivist requirements, and the constraints of the 
NMN and NPR principles, the entire programme of cognitive naturalism 
would seem to be a difficult one to complete. 
Consider the following problems that come easily to mind. First, how 
under cogni t ive natura l i sm is g e n u i n e i n c o n t i n e n c e poss ib le? 
Notwithstanding the considerable efforts of Aristotle and R.M. Hare to 
explain away the phenonmenon, it seems conceivable, indeed it happens, 
that one may sincerely and comprehendingly believe that he ought to do 
one thing and yet intentionally not do it. Second, i f . the possibility of 
genuine incontinence is secured on some CN account, how could that 
same account conform to the NPR principle? If not outright inconsistent, 
incontinence and the validity of NPR lie together uneasily, to say the least. 
Third, in general, true claims by an agent that he desires or prefers 
something are not, without more, normatively justified. How might 
cognitive naturalists allow for the possibility that actual desires are not 
self-justifying? 
Regarding this last question, it will not do merely to advert to a 
narrowly decision theoretic model to explicate the ways in which desires 
and preferences are subject to rational and normative criticism, for 
decision theory generally takes the intrinsic desires and preferences of an 
agent as fixed from a normative point of view. Only extrinsic or derivative 
desires can be criticized, for example, in terms of factual error, sheer 
ignorance or inferential gaf fe . 5 However, many considerations suggest 
that the normative concepts we now employ allow for the possibility that 
even an agent 's intrinsic desires and preferences can be subject to 
normative criticism, criticism that is somehow inherently binding upon the 
agent or otherwise rationally compelling. From those who hold that this is 
impossible, an argument is needed, and none that is convincing has been 
forthcoming. 
It might appear, moreover, that an adherent of cognitive naturalism 
would have to produce just such an argument. But while it is true that 
establishing that intrinsic desires are beyond normative criticism would 
complete the cognitive naturalist programme in metacthics, doing so is 
not essential to that programme. It is so far conceivable that all the 
constraints of cognitive naturalism be met consistently with the possibility 
of sound normative criticism of intrinsic desires. Indeed, any account on 
5 Sce , e.g., Impartial Reason, by Stephen Darwall, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1983, Chapter 6. 
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which such criticism was not possible would seem incomplete and 
unconvincing without an explanation of what in our scheme of normative 
concepts has led us to think and talk as if it were. Though not a matter of 
necessity, it would be odd if it turned out that those concepts were rankly 
incoherent. It is not, however, incumbent on the cognitive naturalist to 
guarantee that intrinsic desires and preferences are in fact normatively or 
rationally criticizable. It might turn out, for example, that the possibilty of 
such criticism presupposes the satisfaction of remote or contingent 
conditions not generally within the ken of those employing normative 
concepts. And such conditions may not in fact be satisfied. 6 If so, any 
putative extension of the decision theoretic model to allow for the criticism 
of intrinsic desires would fail, not the minimal test of internal consistency, 
but that of global coherence. 
2 
It will be worthwhile to have a look at a version of cognitive 
naturalism. 7 Perhaps not surprisingly, my favorite is my own. We may 
begin by examining two fundamental theoretic definitions around which it 
is built. These definitions, of the artificial terms, .'good*' and 'ought^', are 
not intended to give the meaning of either 'good' or 'ought' in English, but 
to explicate very special senses, one might say limiting cases, of their 
ordinary counterparts, 'good*' corresponds to the notion of something's 
having value in the strongest possible sense; 'ought^' to the notion of what 
an agent ought overridingly to do, not, for example, qua surgeon, artist, 
politician, egoist, perfect altruist, or even qua moral agent (should it turn 
out that what one morally ought to do is not of conceptual necessity the 
same as what one ought overridingly to do). 
^rhis might happen where, for example, the possibility of such criticism 
presupposed the existence of cognitive and/or inferential 
operations which might serve to produce, cancel or modify intrinsic 
desires, but it turned out that there could be no such operations given the 
facts about the human nervous system. (I plan to deal with this entire 
issue in a forthcoming work.) 
7 Although they might not accept all of the constraints in terms of which I 
have defined cognitive naturalism, several philosophers have put forward 
theories which seem in large measure to conform to them. Recent works 
by Richard Brandt, David Falk and Peter Railton are prominent examples. 
See Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1979, especially chapters I-VIII; Falk, Ought, Reasons, and Morality, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986, especially the essays, "Fact, Value, 
and Nonnatural Predication," pp. 99-122, and "Hume on Is and Ought," pp. 
123-142; Railton, "Moral Realism," The Philosophical Review XCV (1986), 
pp. 163-207. 
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Where S is an agent, X a thing, A an action or action type within S's 
power to perform at time t, we have: 
(T) A thing X is (to some extent) good* (relative to S) if, 
and only if, S would have some positive motivation toward X were 
S adequately to consider enough facts about X such that his 
adequate consideration of any further facts about it would not 
alter the positive character of that motivation. 
For 'ought^, 
(To) S oughtdD to perform A at t if, and only if, S would 
choose to perform A at t were S adequately to consider enough 
facts about that alternative such that his adequate consideration 
of any further facts about it would not alter his choice. 
The foregoing definitions are not by any means adequate as they stand, 
but will suffice for a moment to give the reader the general idea. 8 
There are several things to note about these definitions. First, there is 
no requirement that the "facts" in question be either epistemically 
available to the agent or in some narrow sense "empirical"; all that is 
required is that they really be facts about the thing or alternative in 
question. Theological facts, though in practice hard to verify, may be 
acutely relevant to a claim about what one o u g h t s to do. That, for 
example, an omnipotent Being would punish an act of extramarital sex 
with eternal torment may quite sensibly discourage impending action. 
Certainly, it might be argued that there has to be an cpistemological 
dimension here. If a motivationally relevant fact about a thing is, relative 
to an agent, in principle incapable of being known, that may provide some 
warrant for not requiring even hypothctically that he consider it. But to 
sustain this view, one would have to provide compelling reasons for taking 
that approach rather than the obvious alternative, viz., holding that, 
although an agent's consideration of any fact, viewed as representable by 
him in abstraction from epistemic considerations, is required under T and 
T<0, some evaluative and normative truths may be, on the CN model, in 
principle unknowable. 
Second, the (projected) process of "adequate consideration" invoked 
in the definitions must be understood, and be capable of being explicated, 
reductively, i.e., without essential appeal to any genuine normative or 
evaluative concept. In relation to T and T/j), the process principally 
involves representing facts, making inferences from what one has 
represented and attending to what one has represented or inferred. In 
this connection, the following requirements are stipulated. Any inferences 
*The definitions set out in the text are intentionally oversimplified. More 
technically detailed explications of these notions are included in appendix 
to this paper. 
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would alter the category of the relevant agent's motivation (under T) or 
decision (under T o ) must be logically valid or, broadly, epistemically 
sound. If an agent makes an invalid inference such that, had he not made 
it, his decision or motivation would be different, adequate consideration is 
not complete. If there is some valid inference, not yet made, such that, 
were the agent to make it, his decision or motivation would be different, 
adequate consideration is again not complete. If, finally, there is some 
additional time an agent might spend attending to some bit of correct 
information he has, whether acquired by inference or not, such that were 
he to attend to it for that time, his decision or motivation would alter, the 
process is also not complete. 
Third, the basic difference between 'good*' and 'ought©', besides the 
obvious fact that the latter applies only to actions, is that in the case of 
'ought©', if it is true that an agent ought© to perform a certain action, then 
given that he has adequately considered that alternative, he will, must, 
attempt to ac t . 9 On the other hand, if it is true that a thing is 'good*' 
relative to an agent, then given that he has adequately considered that 
thing, all that is required under T is that he have some positive motivation 
toward it. Nothing follows immediately about what actions he will 
undertake. In general, one may want a thing and yet not seek to have or 
further it. There may be other things one wants even more. We might 
extrapolate here, although I do not think the inference is by any means 
easy or simple, and say that what an agent ought© to do is wholly or 
partially a function of what is good* (or bad*) relative to him. 
Fourth, and very important, while we focus here only on two central 
definitions, the general model they exemplify, facts + consideration 
yielding motivational response, is not limited to them alone. A metacthics 
of general application should provide the conceptual resources for 
analyzing the great variety of normative and evaluative predicates there 
are. Prima facie, this theory does so. By adding different sorts of 
qualifications and restrictions to T and T©, one can indeed begin to 
account for this variety in a number of ways. 
Perhaps the most obvious is by restricting the type of fact an agent is 
required to consider. For example, one might undertake to explicate the 
notion of "aesthetic beauty" in part in terms of a restriction indicating 
which facts about things are, and are not, specifically relevant to the 
question of their beauty. Thus, an aesthetically beautiful thing may be one 
that agents would respond positively to upon adequately considering 
features of its form which can be exhibited in one or more of their sensory 
'Recall that 'ought©' applies only to actions within the agent's power to 
perform at the relevant time. 
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m o d a l i t i e s . 1 0 In a similar vein, one might undertake to explicate moral 
claims, for example, in an analysis of the expression 'morally ought', in 
terms of a restriction on the sort of fact hypothetically to be considered by 
an agent (or class of agents) to those facts that are suitably "impartial" in 
that they do not relate to matters of "self-interest" or individual advantage. 
There are many possibilities here . 1 1 In both of these cases, the strategy is 
to account, at least in part, for the particularity of the normative or 
evaluative concept under analysis in terms of a limited range of facts 
delimited descriptively. 
The range of facts agents are to consider is not the only parameter 
which may be modified in attempts to provide explications of different 
normative and evaluative predicates. Another is the intensity of the 
projected motivational response. Thus, the claim that a painting is 
"magnificent" or a symphony "great" may involve the requirement that the 
projected motivational response be a relatively strong one, say, within the 
class of projected posit ive responses (always given the adequate 
consideration of some range of relevant facts) to things of that kind. 
Alternatively, certain evaluative claims may entail that the projected 
response, though still broadly "motivational," have in addition a certain 
phenomenological quality or concomitant. To return to our tentative, and 
likely defective, analysis of aesthetic beauty, some may feel it is defective 
precisely because it omits any reference to the "aesthetic quality" the 
response must have, a quality with which one can be acquainted, but which 
1 0 T w o problems with the details of this proposal arc these. First, there is 
the need to distinguish aesthetic beauty from, e.g., sexual attractiveness. 
Second, and more difficult, is the question of how one would handle 
matters of substance in literary and other "representational" media, e.g., 
what is said in a novel or the subjects treated in a painting or film. These 
are not, in themselves, obviously matters of "form," but are clearly relevant 
to the larger issue of aesthetic merit. Perhaps that is part of the answer, 
viz., that "aesthetic beauty" is a narrower notion than "aesthetic merit." 
" V a r i o u s other qualified normative and evaluative claims can be 
explicated in a different way, namely, in terms of a condition ingredient in 
their predicates that relativizes adequate consideration to an antecedently 
specified desire or interest, actual or hypothetical, or set of them. Relevant 
facts would again, but more indirectly, be restricted to those that are 
logically or epistemically relevant to the question of whether the subject of 
the claim furthers or answers to the posited desires and interests. Claims 
that might yield to this kind of analysis arc, for example, 'That is a good 
white wine.", "M is a good method of torture for extracting information 
from captives.", "X is a good carving knife.", and so on. (Cf. Paul Z i f f s 
account of "good' in Semantic Analysis, Cornell University Press, I960, 
Chapter VI.) 
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cannot be analyzed or understood solely in terms of motivation and 
parameters intrinsic to it. 
While I don't think that there is any such thing as the "aesthetic 
phenomenological quality," it is open to others who find such an approach 
palatable to argue for it. T h e crucial point in regard to cognitive 
naturalism, however, is that insofar as claims about the beauty of a thing 
are, as most would hold that they are, normative or evaluative, their truth 
must somehow be related to the actual or projected motivations o f agents. 
To characterize the relevant response solely in phenomenological terms, 
jettisoning any internal connection between it and resultant motivation, 
will not work. What could there possibly be in any nonmotivational 
phenomenological quality that constitutes it as normative or evaluative? 
Being red has, I suppose, a phenomenological aspect, but not thereby a 
normative one. To argue in the metaethical case that this quality is very 
special, even though in no respect motivational, rings hollow for several 
reasons. It again leaves open the clear possibility that normative and 
evaluative facts are, even for thoughtful well-informed agents fully 
acquainted with them, no more relevant to our actions and plans than 
random facts about colors or prime numbers . Moreover, that the 
phenomenological quality in question is "special," and hence elusive, is 
implausible. Many who have no trouble applying normative and 
evaluative concepts are unaware of any such quality. It can't be that it is 
just hard to perceive, for assuming that I and others have, and are aware 
that we have, any number of true evaluative beliefs derived in large 
measure from our experience of things, we must have been, all along, 
acquainted with this quality day in and day out, but can't locate it on any 
map of phenomenological qualities of which we are aware. 
I might add here that it seems to me a bit late in the day to be raising 
the question, almost ab initio, of whether values can be understood on the 
model of secondary qualities, e.g., colors. If cognitive naturalism can claim 
for itself the explanatory advantages I think it can, there will be little need 
to develop, nor much hope of success in developing, a new kind of 
metaethics on the secondary quality model. In my view, the best one can 
say is that there are some similarities between value and secondary 
qualities, and some profound dissimilarities. For example, concerning the 
latter, there is no sui generis sensation or perceptual quality conceptually 
linked with correct ascriptions of the corresponding secondary quality, 
here, goodness. The closest thing available are positive motivational 
responses which, just in themselves, are very much unlike sensations. 
Moreover, it would be stretching things quite a bit to say that the analog of 
"normal conditions" for secondary quality ascriptions here could be the 
adequate consideration of sufficiently many facts. One could argue for 
these views, but my point is that the secondary quality "model" will 
eventually drop out as irrelevant. Aside from vaguely gesturing at the 
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needed details of a developed cognitive naturalist theory, no advantage is 
ga ined. 1 2 
Another recent metaethical alternative to cognitive naturalism is 
Simon Blackburn's "quasi-realism" or "projectivism." I can see no 
advantage there over cognitive naturalism either, Quasi-realism is a 
sophisticated version of noncognitivism with the added hypothesis of a 
certain psychological process to explain why we erroneously talk about 
values as properties that objects external to us have, and therefore 
derivatively, err in being metaethical realists and cognitivists. Blackburn 
writes, "On this view (which he attributes to Humel we have sentiments 
and other reactions, caused by natural features of things, and we 'gild or 
stain* the world by describing it as if it contained features answering to 
these sentiments, in the way that the niceness of an ice-cream answers to 
the pleasures it gives u s . " 1 3 Nevertheless, cognitive naturalism, which, 
recall, is both cognitivist and realist, if it can explain the intrinsic relevance 
of normative and evaluative facts to agent motivation, has a general 
advantage over all forms of noncognitivism, namely, it can subsume their 
explanatory successes and intuitive appeal without at the same time 
having tortuously to explain away the fact that we make genuine claims to 
truth and knowledge regarding normative matters. Moreover, a second 
major motivation for noncognitivism, that cognitivists are inevitably faced 
with an intolerable choice between an implausible descriptivism on the 
one hand, and mysterious nonnatural properties, on the other, has no 
force against C N accounts, as we shall see. 
One of the principal grounds on which Blackburn himself rejects 
cognitivism and realism in ethics is his view that the notion that normative 
1 2 John McDowell has taken some tentative steps toward developing such a 
model for normative and evaluative concepts. See his "Values and 
Secondary Qualities," in Morality and Objectivity, A Tribute to J.L. Mackie, 
edited by Ted Honderich, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 110-129. 
Simon Blackburn and Alan Coldman have voiced some rather stiff 
criticisms of the approach. See "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value," 
by Simon Blackburn, in Honderich, op. cit., pp. 1-22; and "Red and Right," 
by Alan H. Coldman, The Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), pp. 349-362. A 
careful reading of Coldman's paper will indicate that cognitive naturalism 
is quite immune to the difficulties he raises for McDowell, as it is also 
immune to related objections advanced by Warren S. Quinn against 
"moral realism." See Quinn's "Moral and Other Realisms: Some Initial 
Difficulties," in Values and Morals, edited by Alvin I. Coldman and 
Jacgwon Kim, D. Reidel, 1978, pp. 257-273. 
1 3 Blackburn, op. cit., p. 5. Sec also his "Rule-Following and Moral Realism," 
in Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, edited by Steven Holtzman and 
Christopher M. Lcich, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 163-187; and 
Spreading the Word, Oxford University Press, 1984, especially Chapter 6. 
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and evaluative properties somehow supervene on first-order natural facts 
about things is incoherent . 1 4 In my view, Blackburn's chief mistake 
regarding supervenience is that he assumes that if a thing's having value is 
a function of certain of its natural-features, it is solely a function of them. 
However, such a strong conception of supervenience is not needed to 
explain the linguistic and conceptual data. Plausible analyses of 
evaluative supervenience have been developed on analogy to natural 
dispositional properties. Consider the account by John Campbell and 
Robert Pargetter: 
Can we use the model we have used to express the relationship 
between fragility and its natural basis to explicate the nature of the 
relationship between moral and natural properties? This would come 
to the following. When we say that some state S is good because it is 
pleasurable, we mean the following: 
(3) being good = having some property which is responsible for 
being such that <...>. 
and 
(4) the property which is responsible for S's being such that <...> = 
being pleasurable. 
On this account goodness is a second order property. It is the 
property of having a property which is responsible for S's being such 
that it exhibits what we might call "goodness phenomena," and in 
virtue of which the goodness phenomena are to be explained. So we 
have goodness, goodness phenomena, and the natural basis for 
goodness linked by the two identities. And...(3) will be a necessary 
truth and (4) will be contingent. 1 5 
On my version of cognitive naturalism, there may be some legitimate 
doubt about the existence of "goodness phenomena," a description of 
which would be inserted in '<...>', unless what could count here is the 
content of definition T itself. There are not going to be any "phenomena" 
conceptually linked with 'good*' as there may well be in the case of 
'fragility' or 'solubility* or even 'digestibility*. That there is in fact nothing 
else in or about reality that would affect one's positive motivation toward a 
thing cannot sensibly be understood in terms of a set of characteristic 
phenomena or occurrences, so the analogy may not be perfect. Even so, 
, 4 S e e his "Moral Realism," in Morality and Moral Reasoning, edited by 
John Casey, Methuen & Co., 1971, pp. 101-124, especially pp. 105-116. For a 
reply, not all of which 1 agree with, see "An Alleged Difficulty Concerning 
Moral Properties," by James C. Klagge, Mind 93 (1984), pp. 370-380. 
, 5 "Goodness and Fragility," American Philosophical Quarterly, 23 (1986), 
pp. 155-165, at pp. 161-162. 
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T and T© otherwise fit the model quite well. In (3) and in (4), the righthand 
component in definition T would be put into the brackets, i.e., <S would 
have some positive motivation..., e t c > . That being done, then if the 
analysis given in T is correct, indeed (3) would be necessary and (4) 
contingent. 
3 
As we have seen, it is a fundamental tenet of cognitive naturalism that 
the specifically normative and evaluative character of predicates , 
concepts, propositions, etc., can be understood jointly in terms of the 
projected motivations of agents relative to whom their application is 
indeed normative or evaluative, and the requirement, more or less 
extensive, that such responses have been produced by or survived the 
adequate consideration of some range of facts about the action or thing in 
question. It is vitally important to understand that both components are 
essential . The motivational component serves to account for the 
"guidesomeness" of normative and evaluative claims. Such claims and, if 
true, the facts they indicate, are not inert, or at least, are not as 
contingently related to action as are facts we ordinarily, but perhaps 
obscurely, think of as being merely "descriptive." On the other hand, as we 
have seen, normative concepts do not simply duplicate the function o f 
standard motivational concepts, for example, of a desire, goal, choice, 
preference, decision, and so on. Motivational concepts alone cannot 
provide a model for the analysis of normative and evaluative concepts. 
Such an approach could not account either for the possibility of genuine 
incontinence or the normative criticism of desire. The requirement of 
adequate consideration as a qualification of motivation is intended to 
overcome these deficiencies in the simple subjectivist model. But to come 
full circle, one cannot go so far in allowing for such criticism as to sever all 
connection between motivation and normative concepts, that is, to take an 
extreme objectivist or externalist position. In that case, one is again left 
with the seemingly insurmountable problem of explaining the inherent 
"normativity" of normative claims and facts. 
We can now define the notion of "CN-Normativity": 
An application of predicate P is CN-normative (or evaluative) relative 
to an agent (or class of agents) S and a thing X if, and only if, the truth 
of the proposition, P(X), logically implies that S would have some 
positive or negative motivation toward X upon adequately considering 
some range R of facts about X. 
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A principal substantive claim of cognitive naturalism is that CN-
normativity is an adequate explication of our pre-theoretic notion of 
normativity. 
Having considered in very general terms a number of ways in which 
the scope of adequate consideration might be restricted so as to yield 
analyses of qualified normative concepts, we might return for a moment to 
definitions T and T ( 0 and raise the question of why 'good*' and 'ought©' 
occupy a central place in our account. The answer is simple. It is precisely 
because they are defined without any restriction on the scope of adequate 
consideration. Potentially, any fact about the world is relevant to a claim 
that a thing is good or ought© to be done. This has an important 
consequence: relative to a given agent with respect to whom it is true that 
a thing is good or a certain action ought© to be performed, it follows that if 
he does not have the positive motivation (required under T) or does not at 
least attempt to perform the action (as required under T©) , then he is 
ignorant of some fact about the world, some truth, that would be decisively 
relevant to him were he to be aware of and sufficiently consider it. 
Conversely, if he has achieved adequate consideration as required under 
T and T©, then there is no fact about the world, no consideration, no truth, 
no part of reality, the representation and consideration of which by him 
would alter, respectively, his positive motivation or decision toward the 
thing or action in question. 
It is now also possible to indicate why it is not an essential thesis of 
cognitive naturalism that intrinsic desires be immune to rational or 
normative criticism. This is because it is left a logically open question 
whether even intrinsic desires might be extinguished or their strength 
significantly reduced, or entirely new ones generated, in the process of 
adequate consideration. What psychological mechanisms could account 
for this I do not know. But if such a thing ever occurs, and there is so far no 
argument showing that it cannot, facts relevant to normative matters will 
not of necessity be limited to those relevant to determining which actions 
will maximize net expected utility relative to the entire set of the agent's 
actual intrinsic desires and preferences. 
Under cognitive naturalism, the degree to which desires and choices 
are normatively justified is a function of whether they would survive or be 
produced by the consideration of motivationally relevant truth, the more 
extensive the latter, the greater the degree of normative justification 
involved. No special or a priori normative status is given to any 
descriptively specified subcategory of fact. Nevertheless, within this 
theory, one has the conceptual resources to claim, as a substantive 
empirical matter, that facts falling within any descriptively given category 
would actually be of overriding motivational importance in the context of 
projected adequate consideration. But in doing this one must pay an 
epistcmological price, a price consistent with any genuine commitment to 
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realism, even in metaethics. One must have a sensible answer to the 
question, "How do you know?" 
Some may feel that cognitive naturalism is fatally flawed because it is 
still, in every instance, too relativistic and subjectivist to be faithful to pre-
theoretic normative and evaluative concepts. In T and T«v and in virtually 
every suggestion made above concerning possible ways of analyzing 
qualified normative predications, there appeared, explicitly or implicitly, 
the rider, "relative to (an agent) S". But clearly, not all normative concepts 
are that relative. Otherwise, one couldn't make much sense of the fact that 
different people disagree and argue about the truth of the same normative 
proposition. And even if this basic "no conflicts" objection is avoided once 
we turn to the more complex definitions, T and T ^ ' , 1 6 there is still no way 
on this model to formulate normative claims that purport to have wide 
intersubjective validity. But we do sometimes wish to make such claims. 
Pending an argument that they all must be incoherent, cognit ive 
naturalism should be rejected. 
This would be a troubling argument except for one thing. Nothing is 
easier under cognitive naturalism than to reconstruct normative claims 
purporting to have any degree of intersubjective validity one likes. For 
example, if one wished to provide an analysis of an overriding ought-claim 
which, if true, is normativcly valid for all rational agents whatever, all one 
need do is add to T t o the requirement, as a truth condition, that all rational 
agents, including S, would prefer S's doing A at t to his not doing A at t, 
upon adequately considering the matter. Using this new predicate, if one 
agent asserted that S ought^ to perform A and another denied this, it is 
now logically guaranteed that their pragmatically opposite claims are 
genuinely inconsistent. By adding still further conditions, for example, a 
restriction on the range of relevant facts that they include none pertaining 
to mere self-interest or personal advantage, one might have a model for 
moral claims purporting to have universal intersubjective validity. Finally, 
if one wished to assert that this latter sort of claim was, in addition, 
normatively overriding, one need only additionally assert that the positive 
motivation that would be generated or sustained in every rational agent by 
his or her adequate consideration of "impartial" facts regarding S's 
performing A at t would override any contrary (partial) motivations that 
would be generated in the context of adequate consideration of the sort 
required under T and T w , viz. , factually unrestricted adequate 
consideration. 
One may here have the beginnings of an argument that cognitive 
naturalism, qua foundational account in metaethics, can defeat, or better, 
subsume, a number of its rivals in the category of rational motivation 
theories. Consider all those accounts, whether contractarian or not, which 
1 6 S e e the "Appendix", infra. 
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purport to establish that overriding normative, more often than not 
specifically "moral," requirements can be derived from or discovered by 
determining those choices we would make from behind a veil of ignorance. 
Such claims can be reconstructed within the CN framework as follows. 
The restrictions on information defining the veil in question serve to 
establish what more specific normative predicate or concept is under 
analysis, e.g., 'moral', 'is just', etc. Requirements of unanimity of choice 
establish the degree of intersubjective validity at issue. Finally, the claim 
that such choices, or the principles they select, are overriding would have 
to be, under my theory, a claim to the effect that the motivations or choices 
generated by the consideration of information not excluded would remain 
dominant once the veil is lifted. And indeed, one finds that this last 
condition is often invoked in such accounts, though its satisfaction is just 
assumed. For example, Rawls posits an effective "sense of justice" that will 
sufficiently override inclinations contrary to the requirements of justice. 
Regarding actual practice, as it were, unveiled, that may be only wishful 
thinking. 
That one can, in these and many other ways, reconstruct normative 
and evaluative propositions having any degree of intersubjective validity 
again illustrates the versatility of cognitive naturalism. Yet there is, as I 
have already suggested, an epistemological price for deploying these 
various semantic resources. To assert warrantably a normative claim 
purporting to have, for example, universal intersubjective validity, one 
needs to have good epistemic reasons for thinking that it is indeed true 
that all rational agents would respond similarly to the thing or action in 
question. Quite obviously, such claims require a much stronger or more 
extensive evidentiary grounding than normative c la ims explicitly 
relativised to a single agent or small group of agents. But what is wrong 
with such a consequence? Within a realist framework, broader claims 
naturally demand more extensive justification. 
If some, still holding themselves out to be "realists" in mctaethical 
matters, find this unpalatable, our theoretical suspicions surely ought to be 
aroused. We would then be confronted not only with intuition-based 
requirements regarding the content of normative propositions, often 
accompanied by a medley of intuitions about which such claims must turn 
out to be true, but now with the additional constraint that these claims can 
be, indeed are, known easily or intuitively, e.g., "from the armchair." 
Pressed with enough vigor, this triad of demands can 1 think be shown to 
threaten realism in e th ics . 1 7 
1 7 N o r will it do, I think, to advert here to some such notion as "wide 
reflective equilibrium" even as a methodological alternative to cognitive 
naturalism or as a procedure supposed to be neutral between mctaethical 
accounts. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, reflective equilibrium, 
sensibly interpreted, collapses into cognitive naturalism. See my "Anti-
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Also unavailing as an objection to our proposed treatment of 
intersubjective normative validity is the (from my experience) often 
repeated claim that ordinary normative and evaluative concepts are in no 
sense whatever relativistic. The objection then is that cognitive naturalism 
is inadequate because it allows the use of normative and evaluative 
expressions in judgments that are highly relativised, even to single agents, 
once explicit or implicit intersubjectivity conditions are suspended. But 
our ordinary concepts do not permit that sort of suspension. 
The main problem with this objection is that it wildly ignores linguistic 
reality. One often hears discourses in which normative judgments are 
explicitly relativised and maintained, usually by one or more parties to an 
extended dispute about some such matter. For example, a common 
remark is something like, "Well, from my perspective it is wrong to do that 
sort of thing, but not from yours. I guess we're just basically different in 
this." People now readily reach the point, perhaps prematurely, of giving 
up on the working assumption that the opposing party to a substantive 
dispute hasn't got his facts straight, or hasn't got all the relevant facts, or 
about them has reasoned badly or not enough. To respond that this only 
lamentably shows how the weeds of metaethical relativism have spread 
through the culture won't suffice, for the issue at hand is the content and 
character of normative concepts now in use. 
Indeed, to point toward an outwardly less relativistic age regarding 
normative matters, say the Victorian, does not show that the English had 
fundamentally different normative concepts than we do now. What may 
bet ter explain the re lat ive absence a m o n g them of normat ive 
relativizations in speech and argument is, rather, the prevalence then of 
widely held beliefs which, while not in themselves value judgments, 
nevertheless had implications for the issue of intersubjective normative 
validity. To take one instance, the sort of belief that might account for this 
is the theological one that an omnipotent Cod gave all men and women 
the same basic character. Hence, all would respond alike to things if 
properly educated or informed. (Views very much like this did underlie 
many late nineteenth century reform movements in Great Britain and the 
United States.) Another alternative is the specifically metaethical view, 
then widely inculcated through education and cultural conditioning, that 
Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibria Revisited," Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 69 (1988), pp. 201-221. For a general sketch of wide reflective 
equilibrium, see "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in 
Ethics," by Norman Daniels, The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979), pp. 256-
282. For an (I think unsuccessful) attack on Brandt's version of cognitive 
naturalism from this perspective see Daniels' 'Two Approaches to Theory 
Acceptance in Ethics," in Morality, Reason and Truth, New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ethics, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, 
Rowman & Allcnheld, 1985, pp. 120-140. 
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what is valuable or right is not relative to agents, groups or societies. This is 
not itself a judgment of the lightness or value of anything. Persons of 
widely different cultures might agree on the foregoing point and yet 
disagree on every substantive evaluative matter. 
That the tides of relativism rise and fall historically lends credence to 
my view that what accounts for this are not inexplicable shifts from one set 
of basic normative concepts to another, but rather culturally variable 
correlative hypotheses on which the likelihood of ultimate disagreement is 
different. Moreover, the sort of potential value relativity embraced under 
cognitive naturalism is not the same as value relativism actually asserted. 
The latter is the view that in fact there are significant areas of unresolvable 
disagreement over normative and evaluative matters . Cogni t ive 
naturalism, as an analytical theory, entails neither this view nor its denial. 
It should be noted here that adding to a normative claim conditions 
that, if satisfied, will result in some measure of intersubjective validity does 
not guarantee that the normative requirement expressed by the claim has 
a greater degree of normative validity or force relative to a single agent 
who falls within the relevant class. Under cognit ive naturalism, 
intersubjective normative validity is only "horizontal." The strength of an 
agent's positive response toward or preference for a certain course o f 
action upon adequately considering the matter is not of necessity 
increased should it turn out that all other agents would prefer his taking 
that course upon their considering the matter. Such a thing might occur. 
That is, the very fact that others would prefer that an agent perform a 
certain action might, under adequate consideration, make that alternative 
even more attractive to him. On the other hand, it might not. Conversely, 
the mere fact that one or more others would disprefer a given agent's 
performing an action does not entail that that agent's decision to perform 
it will disappear upon his adequately considering the matter, including, if 
relevant, the fact about others' contrary, but informed, preferences. Once 
we have reached the level of cognitive qualification relative to an agent 
required under T and T©, requirements expressed by true propositions 
which are CN-normative with respect to him are as normative as they can 
get. Facts about the informed preferences of others, if motivationally 
relevant to him, would have already been factored into the process of 
adequate consideration. 
4 
An important objection at this point is that cognitive naturalism allows 
the possibility that virtually any practice, no matter how horrible, might 
turn out to be overridingly normativcly justified for an agent, and such a 
consequence cannot be countenanced, even as a mere logical possibility. 
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How can what is normatively justified or unjustified be held hostage 1 8 to 
the potentially horrendous preferences and choices of perhaps one 
depraved, but adequately informed, agent? Surely normative pluralism 
has some reasonable limits! 
What is being called into question here is the soundness of the NMN 
principle. Moreover, there are really two thrusts to this objection, and one 
of them rests on a misunderstanding. An agent or class of agents is not 
constrained in what they justifiably seek to do or prevent by the adequately 
considered, but contrary, choices of others. On the CN approach, there is 
no required commitment to unlimited tolerance or pluralism in regard to 
any matter. If normative justification, whether overriding or qualified, is 
potentially relative to the projected informed responses of different agents 
or groups of agents, then it may turn out that one agent S would be fully 
justified in attempting to perform an action A, while at the same time 
others would be fully justified, not only in choosing that they themselves 
not perform actions of that type, but in preventing S from doing so as well. 
This issue aside, the deeper question raised by the objection remains, 
namely, how can it be that, even relative to a single agent, certain horrible 
actions might turn out to be normatively justified? It is necessary, 
however, to take care to isolate just what it is that is motivating the 
objection, for some quite legitimate concerns have no bearing here against 
cognitive naturalism, or in particular, my version of it. Nothing in my 
account rules out the possibility that our dearest substantive normative 
judgments are true, or that our most altruistic or benevolent inclinations 
would not only survive, but become dominant in the process of adequate 
consideration. The case, such as it is, for these claims is not weakened by 
cognitive naturalism. Unfortunately, their truth is not logically guaranteed 
either. It is a substantive and in some respects empirical matter whether 
one agent, or all agents, on adequately considering the matter, would 
refrain from committing acts of indiscriminate brutality. But why should 
the provision of such a guarantee constitute a theoretically necessary 
condition for having a successful metaethics? Consider a parallel 
objection that might be offered against an analysis of color terms, for 
example, the term, 'red', that from the analysis alone one cannot deduce 
that the plastic cup sitting before me as I write is red, or that the heaviest 
object in the upper left drawer of my dresser is not red. Or again, consider 
an objection to an account of truth on the ground that it did not guarantee 
that, say, the General Theory of Relativity is true. Neither of these would 
constitute a compelling objection to those accounts. Surely our intuitions 
warrant that there is some sensible distinction to be maintained, even in 
normative matters, between conceptual and/or met a theoretical claims, on 
the one hand, and substantive ones, on the other. 
1 8 T h i s echoes a complaint made against Brandt in Daniels, op. cit., 1985. 
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Accepting the latter claim, of course, does not settle the matter. Why 
not say, for example, that in some cases, beyond certain generous limits, 
some kinds of actions, specified descriptively, just cannot, a conceptual 
'cannot', count as normatively justified even relative to one or a few 
agents? This maneuver, directly to build certain descriptive requirements 
into normative language, faces a dilemma. If such descriptive limits on 
preferences and actions are not somehow combined with links to agents' 
motivational capacities as required by the NPR principle, normative facts 
become implausibly inert, or if being inert is not implausible, then at least 
the whole question of why one should bother or care about what is 
"normatively required" is opened up again. Alternatively, if descriptive 
limits are combined with conditions satisfying the NPR principle, one may 
thereby gain a logical guarantee that it is not the case that brutal acts are 
normatively justified, but by no means does one thereby gain a like 
guarantee that they are normatively unjustified. To see this, consider what 
such a combination of descriptive and motivational conditions might look 
like. Perhaps this: "Performing an action is normatively justified if and 
only if both lone, some, most, all) agents would choose to perform it upon 
adequately considering the matter, and the action in question is not of any 
of the following kinds - indiscriminate brutality,... etc." What this leaves us 
with is plain to see. To the extent that it could turn out that brutality is 
normatively justified given the truth of cognitive naturalism, then to 
precisely the same extent it might turn out under this sort of hybrid 
account that it is not unjustified. All that is gained in deploying the hybrid 
is a potentially larger logical space between the contraries, 'justified' and 
'unjustified', than there was before. And within that space, under whatever 
name it might go, there will remain, certainly for individual agents, the 
practical question: What is to be done? 
An approach some might find more satisfying than the first, perhaps 
because more subtle, is to invoke normative concepts used directly to 
assess the character or motivational capacities of agents. For example, 
suppose an agent S truly asserts of himself that he o u g h t w to do A, where A 
is some act of extreme brutality to be done for its own sake or for fun. Let 
us also assume that "we" would overridingly prefer that S not perform A 
upon our adequately considering the matter. In such a case, and given the 
considerations we have already examined, on what basis could we claim 
that S's decision to perform A is normatively unjustified, not say, just 
relative to us? 
Could one say, and so be done with the issue, that in deciding to do A 
on adequately considering the matter, S has thereby shown himself to 
have a depraved character, and because his decision results in part from 
such a character, it cannot be normatively justified even relative to him? 
But what does this thesis involve? It must be something more than a 
reiteration of the fact, already granted, that our contrary preference 
regarding S's performing A, or perhaps indeed our taking action to prevent 
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S from doing so, is justified relative to us. In fact, a proponent of this 
approach needs to build two bridges to get to any significant conclusion 
here, one bridge from the ascription of "depravity" to the lack of 
justification of S's decision tout a fait, and assuming that is accomplished, a 
second from this established lack of normative justification to something 
in that fact that S must be concerned with in the sense that he cannot 
rationally or coherently ignore it. 
Regarding the first task, we are faced again with a familiar dilemma. 
Either "depravity" is something, in whole or in part, simply descriptively 
delimited, for example, in terms o f a list o f decisions or preferences, 
informed or not, that are simply by definition depraved or show a 
depraved character, or, the second alternative, the normative significance 
of depravity is a function of something else. If the former, we are faced 
with precisely the same epistemic and other problems, now at one 
definitional remove, considered earlier in connection with the attempt 
directly to build descriptive inclusions and exclusions on action into the 
concept of normative justification. If, on the other hand, the normative 
significance of depravity is a function of something else, that something 
else has yet to be spelled o u t . 1 9 Certainly, pointing out that it hasn't does 
not constitute proof that it can't, but one's theoretic patience may begin to 
wear thin, especially where, as here, there is an attractive alternative view 
available. As in most areas of inquiry, good theories do not come complete 
with proofs that no better theory is possible. And most important, any 
succesful competitor to cognitive naturalism must spell out in detail what 
advantage, explanatory or otherwise, is gained over the CN approach, 
specifically, in connection with the latter's allowing the logical possibility 
that contrary preferences about the same thing may be normatively 
justified relative to different agents and leaving it as a contingent fact, if 
fact at all, that this ever happens. 
At this point, what options are left? There is one which might be used 
not only to solve the problems delineated in the last paragraph, but also to 
construct the second (and really more important) bridge from the concept 
of normative justification to the inherent bindingness of valid overriding 
normative requirements, such that, despite the fact that it is true that S 
ought© to perform a brutal act A, it nevertheless remains the case 
that S's decision is normatively unjustified, relative to him or otherwise, 
and this in some respect which accounts for the inescapable relevance of 
the latter claim to him, whether or not that relevance is somehow 
manifested or reflected in his informed motivations. The alternative in 
question is to show that in performing A, S could still be counted as 
irrational no matter how informed is his (positive) motivation regarding A. 
1 9 O f course, it cannot consist of cognitive and inferential qualifications of 
motivation of the sort involved in T and T©, for that would lead us back to 
cognitive naturalism which we have assumed was to be rejected. 
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A substantiated charge of irrationality against even an adequately 
informed S would have profound advantages here. While S's motivation 
could not be altered by facts and arguments we might present to him, and 
hence no claim of inescapable relevance for him could be made out in 
terms of any obvious link with his own motivations, we might here have a 
suitable substitute, viz., that S is somehow being incoherent in choosing 
and pursuing the action A. This may sound initially promising as a way 
around or through the agent-centered limits imposed under cognitive 
naturalism, but there is a danger as well. There is nothing magical about 
the word 'irrational'. The basic problem faced by the opponent of cognitive 
naturalism would not be solved should it turn out, as with the possibilities 
we considered regarding 'unjustified' and 'depraved', that S's choice of A 
was ruled out solely or principally owing to descriptive inclusions or 
exclusions built into the concept of rationality, and nothing more. For 
then, certain aspects of rationality could be coherently ignored by S. 
Rather, what is needed is a showing that S, in performing A knowing or 
believing it to be irrational, is thereby being incoherent. But to date, no 
account has come close to establishing any such th ing . 2 0 
Our assessment of cognitive naturalism ought correspondingly to be 
enhanced could one establish some such result on its basis. In fact, I think 
this can be done. Specifically, I think one can show that an agent who 
(correctly) grants that he o u g h t s to do A, but, because he has not 
2 0 T w o of the recent, and to my mind better, attempts to show that "moral" 
requirements, understood as normative requirements that might be 
contrary to choices one would make in seeking to maximize individual 
expected utility, even under conditions of adequate or full information, are 
requirements of practical rationality are Darwall's Impartial Reason, op. 
cit., and Morals By Agreement, by David Gauthier, Oxford University 
Press, 1986. Concerning the success of either, however, there is plenty of 
reason to doubt. On Gauthier, see "Morality and the Theory of Rational 
Choice," by Jody S. Kraus and Jules L. Coleman, Ethics 97 (1987), pp. 715-
749; on Darwall, see my "Impartiality and Practical Reason," Philosophy 
Research Archives XII (1987), pp. 1-65. I argue that Darwall's project fails, 
inter alia, because at a crucial juncture he simply assumes, contrary to the 
NMN principle, that it is analytically a feature of the ideally or maximally 
rational agent that such an agent would have an overriding preference for 
rationality and rational action no matter how that might affect his other 
interests and in whomever such rationality might manifest itself. 
Moreover, even if this were true, and it is not, that may simply show that 
"rationality" is too thick or substantive a notion to do the required job, 
namely, establishing that an agent who is under a "rational," or whatever, 
fundamental normative requirement, is under a requirement that is 
inescapable in this sense, that if he acknowledges but fails to act in 
accordance with it, he can be shown to be incoherent. 
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completed the process of adequate consideration, has contrary intentions, 
thereby commits himself to an incoherence in his beliefs, desires and 
intentions. The key to showing this would involve demonstrating that, 
under the relevant hypothetical conditions, the object of his intention in 
fact cannot relevantly be what he takes it to be, where what he takes it to 
be is decisively his reason for and the subjective ground of his pursuing it. 
Briefly to sketch this argument, 1 shall first assume that an agent S 
ought© not to perform a certain action A. Let us also suppose that S firmly 
believes this and yet intends to perform A. It so far follows that S has not 
achieved adequate consideration of the alternative A. But in these 
circumstances, where is the incoherence in what S is doing? There is some 
"object" of S's intention to perform A. For example, S may have an 
intrinsic preference to perform A, or may believe that performing A is 
necessary (or the least costly way) to bring about some state of affairs 
which is intrinsically desired or preferred by him. Here the content of the 
relevant intrinsic desire or preference (or set of them) indicates the object 
of S's intention. What is vital to note is that S's intention is not based on 
any desire or motivation he has that is overriding in this sense: he would 
have and/or act on it no matter what further facts about the world he might 
acquire or consider. This would be contrary to our assumption that he 
o u g h t © not to perform A. But it follows then that the object, O, of his 
intention to do A, under the descriptions of O he now accepts, is not what 
he relevantly takes it to be, as he must admit. How so? 
There are only two possibilities. First, some of the motivationally 
relevant beliefs he has regarding O are false, and hence, O is not, in a 
relatively straightforward sense, what he takes it to be. Because S is 
logically committed to granting this, he must also grant that that he is 
pursuing O in or by performing A because O is, say, F, and yet it is not. 
This is incoherent. Second, it may be that while all the beliefs that S so far 
has about O are true, there are other facts about it, and hence about his 
performing A, which would alter his intention to perform A and which ate 
such that no further facts would change it back. But in that case, and given 
that O is not (and cannot by hypothesis be) intrinsically and overridingly 
desired by S in the sense already indicated, what is the object O of S's 
current intention to perform A? It is O, under the true descriptions S now 
accepts, together with the following condition: "O, provided that there is 
nothing else about O that would make me |S1 prefer not to perform A." But 
since, on our assumptions, facts exist which guarantee that this last 
condition is not satisificd, it follows that, as S knows, S would prefer to act 
only if the open condition is satisfied, and yet must grant that it is not, and 
still intends to perform A. That is again incoherent. 
But why is it essential to the coherence of his intention and impending 
action that S not know that the open condition is not satisfied? That is the 
crucial question here. Well, from what has already been said it is simply a 
fact that S's intention is conditional with respect to the state of the world 
136 A U S L E G U N G 
beyond the specific true beliefs he now has regarding O and A. This is the 
fact expressed by the open condition. On all the assumptions we have 
made so far, S is in the position of having to say or admit just this: "I desire 
O because it is F (or in the limit, just because it is "O" or "A"), but not come 
what facts there may. But I grant that it is guaranteed that facts of the 
relevant sort obtain." In essence, S wants an O which is not relevantly the 
O he wants. The second possibility therefore also leads to a practical 
incoherence. 
If the foregoing argument works, or can be made to work by suitable 
modification and expansion, we have quite an interesting result. Failure to 
do what one knows or grants one ought^ to do is irrational in the most 
fundamental sense: it is incoherent. This holds for any S and A, and holds 
without positing any substantive desire in S whatsoever, e.g., a desire to be 
"rational." Moreover, only 'ought^' guarantees this result (with the 
possible exception of a normative predicate that unnecessarily requires 
full omniscience of the relevant agent). We may now begin to understand 
why it is a genuine and open question whether "moral," or indeed any 
other ought's are rationally overriding. 
5 
A final matter we shall address is the general objection to cognitive 
naturalism that normative and evaluative concepts are in content more 
objective than it allows. As we shall see, it is sometimes hard to get a 
handle on what is involved in the view that they are "objective" in some 
respect that defeats at least the reportive success of my account. 
Consider John Mackie's widely known discussion and rejection of 
"objective values" in Chapter 1 of Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.21 It 
is most instructive to note how Mackie himself is pulled in different 
directions in his attempts to explicate normative objectivity. In fact, in a 
number of places he so characterizes the notion that definitions T and T w 
would suffice. For example, he writes: "So far as ethics is concerned, my 
thesis that there are no objective values is specifically the denial that any 
such categorically imperat ive element is ob ject ively val id . " (29) 
Presumably, if there were some such "categorically imperative element," 
there would be an objective value. But what sort of element is in question? 
"A categorical imperative, then, would express a reason for acting which 
was unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present 
desire of the agent [or perhaps any agent] to whose satisfaction the 
recommended action would contribute as a means - or more directly: 'You 
2 1 Penguin Books, 1977. Parenthetical references in this section of the text 
are to pages in this work. 
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ought to dance', if the implied reason is just that you want to dance or like 
dancing, is still a hypothetical imperative." (29) Just so, that an agent 
o u g h t s to perform an action is likewise not contingent in these respects. 
The truth of such a claim does not presuppose or posit any present desire 
in any agent, including the subject of the claim. 
Referring to any arguments that support an evaluative conclusion, 
Mackie puts his central point another way: "...what I am saying is that 
somewhere in the input to this argument - perhaps in one or more of the 
premisses, perhaps in some part of the form of the argument - there will 
be something which cannot be objectively validated - some premiss which 
is not capable of being simply true, or some form of argument which is not 
valid as a matter of general logic, whose authority or cogency is not 
objective, but is constituted by our choosing or deciding to think in a 
certain way." (30) Yet, as before, the truth of a claim that one o u g h t s to 
perform a certain action does not depend on our choosing or deciding to 
think in a certain way, at least in any relevant sense of 'think in a certain 
way.' Of course, the truth of a sentence token of the type, "This rock weighs 
more than 2 kilograms.", presupposes in some way that "we" have and 
apply the concepts invoked by terms in the claim, e.g., of a rock, a 
kilogram, what it is to have a certain weight, and so on. But that can't be 
what makes a claim not "objective." 
Finally, Mackie claims that the ordinary person uses moral language 
to characterize an action as it is "in i tse l f and not to make claims about or 
to express his, or anyone else's, attitude or relation to it. "But the 
something he wants to say is not purely descriptive, certainly not inert, but 
something that involves a call for action or for the refraining from action, 
and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire or preference or 
policy or choice, his own or anyone else's." (33) The claim that someone 
o u g h t s to perform an action is not about that action as it is "in itself," but 
neither is it simply about or expressive of anyone's attitudes. The truth of 
such a claim does, however, have something to do with certain relations 
holding between some one or more agents and the action in question. But 
again, its truth is not contingent upon anyone's actual desires, preferences, 
etc. 
Some may think that the proper rejoinder to my response to Mackie is 
to say that he should not have limited to the present desires of agents 
those "contingent" factors which rob a normative or evaluative claim of its 
status as objective. There is in fact some textual support for the view that 
he did not embrace any such limit. In discussing what the ordinary man is 
concerned with when considering the objective morality of doing research 
on bacteriological warfare, Mackies states, ' T h e question is not, for 
example, whether he really wants to do this work, whether it will satisfy or 
dissatisfy him, whether he will in the long run have a pro-attitude towards 
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it...." ( 3 3 ) 2 2 The last-quoted clause implies that the "pro-attitude" in 
question need not be a present one. Later on, again attempting to mark 
off genuine from ersatz objective values, Mackie muses, "How much 
simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be if we could 
replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which 
could be causally related to the detection of the natural features on which 
the supposed quality is said to be consequential." (41) With suitable 
restrictions on the sort of causal relation at issue, e.g., that the relevant 
subjective response be motivational and occur as a result of the process of 
adequate consideration, this is close to a description of 'good* ' and 
ought©'. 
I want to claim, nevertheless, that cither Mackie's conception of 
objective value is itself internally incoherent, and hence implausible as a 
reportive analysis of evaluative objectivity, or, that the sort of facts involved 
in correct applications of 'good* ' or 'ought©' could, if universally 
intcrsubjectively qualified, count as objective values. Mackie would likely 
disagree with both disjuncts. With the first because he seemed to think 
that, while there is nothing in reality answering to our concept of objective 
value |his "error" theory!, at least the concept itself is coherent even if what 
it is of is a bit strange. (40) Probably with the second because 
intersubjective agreement in what is valued, even if universal, is not on his 
view sufficient for the objectivity of values, though under the right 
conditions, it might well be necesssary. This strongly suggests that claims 
that might be constructed from the definitions of 'good*' or 'ought©' by 
adding truth conditions requiring convergent responses across agents 
cannot count, even if true, as indicating something about objective values. 
To begin the argument, it is important to bear in mind that Mackie 
rejects descriptive naturalism as a possible account of objective values. 
(23) Normative and evaluative terms, insofar as they are used to refer to 
genuinely objective values, are not merely "descriptive o f natural features 
of actions and things. (32) Accounts of the latter sort fail to capture the full 
content of the notion of objective value: "On a naturalist analysis, moral 
judgments can be practical, but their practicality is wholly relative to 
desires or possible satisfactions of the person or persons whose actions arc 
to be guided; but moral judgments seem to say more than this. This view 
leaves out the categorical quality of moral requirements." (33) Claims 
about what is objectively valuable, including moral claims, involve in part a 
"...claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity..." (35), a "categorically 
imperative aspect...". (33) But what is that? 
Surprisingly, an answer to this last and rather crucial question is not 
spelled out in any detail by Mackie. Indeed, his entire direct elaboration 
of "categorical prescriptivity" is made in two brief characterizations of 
Plato's "Form of the Good." He says that just knowing or "seeing" it "...will 
2 2 M y italics. 
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not merely tell men what to do but will ensure that they do it, overruling 
any contrary inclinations." (23) Again, 
Plato's Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would 
have to be. T h e Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it 
provides the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; 
something's being good both tells the person who knows this to pursue 
it and makes him pursue it. An objective good would be sought by 
anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any contingent fact 
that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this 
end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built 
into it. (40) 
Now, it seems to me that the very last explication in this passage really is 
none, and can be forgotten here, for "having to-be-pursued ness built in" 
adds nothing helpful to the one with which we started, "categorical 
objective prescriptivity." But in that case, and setting aside the matter of 
intersubjective agreement in motive or inclination, a possible aspect of 
objective value which can be reconstructed within the cognitive naturalist 
framework, what are we left with which sets objective values apart, qua 
thing or fact, from partial or overriding motivations produced in the 
process of adequate consideration? 
One thing it cannot be, given Mackie's own formulations, is that an 
objective value, or what is involved in a thing's having such value, must be 
specified wholly independently of any facts about agents, in particular, any 
facts about their motivational capacities, if not their antecedent actual 
motivations. If categorical prescriptivity is, as Mackie wants to claim, part 
of the very concept of objective value, then clearly in the explication of that 
concept, or implicit in its application to things and actions, some reference 
to agent motivation must be involved. If a thing has objective value, there 
must be something about the agent or agents in question in virtue of which 
their knowledge of or acquaintance with that value, or things that have it, 
generates the required motivation. If the concept both rules in and rules 
out just this sort of relation, it is incoherent. 
How might one avoid this incoherence and at the same time escape 
the conclusion that the sort of fact indicated by correct applications of 
'good*' or 'ought©, fully intcrsubjectively qualified, can count as objective 
values? While either fact requires something vis a vis the motivational 
capacities of one or more agents, no antecedent desires are posited. 
Indeed, since on Mackie's own account, some connection between 
objective value and motivation is necessary, what better than cognitive 
naturalism explains why it is that the causal power of objective value works 
its motivational effect by way of an agent's knowledge of or acquaintance 
with objectively valuable things? It might not be that way. For example, 
one can imagine objects that emit strange rays which restructure an 
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agent's nervous system so that, when he came within a certain distance, he 
is caused to have certain desires, all this bypassing any cognitive 
operations in him and deactivating, also without the aid of the latter, any 
contrary desires. Would the existence of such an object somewhere in the 
universe thereby guarantee that there was one objectively valuable thing? 
Not obviously. 2 3 Moreover, on such a view, one would have no explanation 
whatever of the supervenience of value on natural facts. Under cognitive 
naturalism, one has a relatively straightforward explanation of this and of 
the phenomenon of reason-giving. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it seems that cognitive naturalism provides 
the best available explanation both of the logical independence from one's 
actual desires of a thing's having objective value and the fact that the 
motivating effect of objectively valuable things proceeds via the cognition 
of facts about them. T and T© may indeed be faithful to our pre-theoretic 
normative and evaluative concepts even if certain of the latter are 
"objective" in the ways Mackie thought. In fact, perhaps the only 
discrepancy between 'good* ' and the Platonic notion as Mackie has 
characterized it is that the latter seems, implausibly, to rule out the 
possibility of genuine incontinence, while cognitive naturalism, on the 
other hand, does not. 
An additional point I have been postponing may profitably be 
introduced here. I have said that my version of cognitive naturalism allows 
for the possibility of genuine incontinence. It docs, not only in the respect 
that an agent might firmly judge or believe that he overridingly ought to do 
one thing and yet deliberately not do it, but also that he might know this 
and yet fail to act accordingly. To see this, consider an agent S who 
overridingly desires and intends to perform an action A. But also suppose 
that there is a great and near omniscient being G who, as S firmly and 
reasonably believes, understands both the world and S's capacity to be 
motivated by the consideration of fact so that G can determine perfectly 
what S ought© to do. Suppose that C docs this and correctly informs S that 
S ought© not to perform A. On that basis alone, S might well come to 
believe that this is so. Moreover, there is no obvious incoherence in 
holding that S, in these circumstances, might know what we have supposed 
2 3 T h c point is that the fact that an object would have this odd effect does 
not show, intuitively or otherwise, that it is objectively valuable then and 
there. One complication, however, arises owing to the NMN principle. 
Under it, no projected or actual desire that underlies the ascription of *-
value to a thing can be ruled out merely owing to its causal etiology in the 
agent. Hence, if an agent is so affected by an object, quite independently 
of cognitive and inferential operations, that he now desires it and would 
continue to do so upon adequately considering it, then from that time on 
the thing in question is, to some extent, good relative to him. 
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him truly to believe. Does it follow on definition T© (or T^') that S in fact 
will choose not to perform A? No. It is an open question whether this 
additional information acquired by S, once it is adequately considered by 
him, will motivate him not to perform A. All that the truth of the claim that 
S o u g h t w not to do A relevantly requires here is that there exist facts, 
representable by S, such that were he to consider them, he would choose 
not to do A, and further, there are no further facts about doing or not doing 
A that would, upon being adequately considered, change his mind again. 
There is no a priori guarantee that his knowing all this will actually 
motivate S not to perform A. It might or it might not. 
Even so, it may be possible here, without stretching things too much, 
to rehabilitate the Socratic/Platonic denial o f genuine incontinence 
alluded to and ultimately accepted by Aristotle. 2 4 If we make a distinction 
between judging or knowing that one o u g h t s to do a thing, and knowing 
what makes it overridingly required, then indeed, under T and T<&, genuine 
incontinence is possible only regarding the former, not the latter. Socrates, 
or Plato, might well reply that genuine knowledge that a thing is required 
must be by way of full knowledge of the properties of or facts about it in 
virtue of which it is required. Second-hand knowledge of the sort involved 
in our example won't do. Although this invokes a stronger sense of 'know' 
than standardly at work in ordinary English, there is no deep inconsistency 
here. 
Certainly, there are other forms of metaethical objectivism besides 
Mackie's. For example, one might embrace an extreme objectivism on 
which normative and evaluative facts do not involve anything like 
"categorical prescriptivity." On this view, that a thing is objectively 
valuable or required need have nothing to do with the prospective effect of 
acquaintance with it on the motivations of agents. Whether agents would 
choose to pursue it or even respond positively to it is here entirely a 
contingent matter. Hence, extreme objectivism would have no trouble 
allowing for the possibility of incontinence. Indeed, it seems that such a 
theory would have too little trouble here. Except for a fortuitous accident, 
cases of full blown incontinence should be as common and unsurprising as 
cases of continence. 
This last matter aside, however, we do seem to be running out of 
options. I can think of only two. First, extreme objectivism might take the 
form of descriptive naturalism, viz., identifying value and normative 
requirement with complexes of natural features of things, most likely those 
features which are standardly cited as counting in favor of a claim that a 
thing is good or required. T h e problems with descriptive naturalism have 
accumulated at least since Moore and need not be recounted here in 
24Nichomachean Ethics, Book VII, Chapter 2, respectively at 1145b 26-30 
and 1147b 15-16). 
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detail. To my mind, the most devastating of these is that normative and 
evaluative properties are inexplicably both redundant and, following 
Mackie, inert. 2 * 
The other al ternative for extreme objectivism is to embrace 
mctaethical nonnaturalism. Objective value is now to be identified with a 
"nonnatural , " or at least nonempirical , feature of things which, 
nevertheless, must also remain inert in the sense that there is no 
conceptually necessary connection between a thing's having it and 
anything about agent motivation. Unfortunately, this approach has less to 
recommend it than did descriptive naturalism. Not only do normative and 
evaluative features remain problematically inert, as on the latter view, but 
now two new difficulties arise, as is also well known. One is that the (at least 
partial) supervenience of value on natural fact becomes inexplicable. The 
second is that the entire system of normative and evaluative concepts is 
open, wide open, to Mackie's error theory, for there is not the slightest 
reason, so far, to believe that the required sort of nonnatural property 
exists. 
6 
In conclusion, it seems to me that the primary theoretical motivations 
for holding an extreme, or indeed any, objectivist position is first, to ensure 
that true normative claims, or the most fundamental of them, can be 
universally intersubjectively valid; and second, to maintain a robust 
distinction between what is desired (or what in fact motivates) and what is 
justified (or justificatory). Cognitive naturalism answers to both. Thus, as 
long as there are compelling reasons to remain metaethical cognitivists 
and realists, we ought to be cognitive naturalists, or at a minimum, need to 
take a long and sympathetic look at this type of theory. 
Appendix 
Here I shall set out more complete explications of the central notions 
involved in my version of cognitive naturalism. For 'good*', wc have: 
( T ) A thing X is (to some extent) good* if, and only inadequate 
consideration of a (minimal) evaluat ivcly complete set of 
^ o say nothing of the striking linguistic implausibility involved in certain 
versions of this sort of account, viz., that what, for example, "good' means 
prcdicatively changes as the term is applied to different kinds of things. 
What descriptively makes a thing a good carving knife is not at all the 
same as what makes a thing a good melon. See e.g., Paul Ziff, op. cit., pp. 
202-203. 
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conditions holding with respect to X would generate, or not 
extinguish if already operative, some positive motivation toward X 
in those subjects who would have the same kind of motivation 
(positive, negative or indifferent) toward X upon adequately 
considering the elements in such a set. 
I here add the further condition that 'good*'is properly predicated of an 
object X by a speaker only if it is presupposed by him that he would 
respond positively to X upon adequately considering the matter. To assert 
that a thing is good*, without further explicit or implicit qualification being 
made or operative, logically implies that the speaker would respond 
positively toward it if adequately informed. Hence, a sentence token of the 
form, "X is good*", used assertively, is true only if the speaker would so 
respond. In effect, then, 'X is good*' is (roughly) equivalent to 'X is such 
that I (the speaker], and all those who would respond as I would upon 
adequately considering X, would respond positively to X'. To suspend this 
condition, one need only introduce some qualifying expression, for 
example as in, 'Relative to agent or agents S, X is good*'. In asserting a 
proposition which might be expressed by a sentence of this latter form, the 
speaker is not asserting something which, even if true, would be "CN-
normative" or "CN-evaluativc" for him. (For a definition of this last notion, 
see section 3 supra.) 
For 'oughts' , we have: 
(Tea) $ o u S n t < o t o perform A if, and only if, adequate consideration 
of a (minimal) evaluativcly complete set of conditions holding 
with respect to the alternative A (i) would generate a decision 
(choice, dominant desire) in S to perform A, or would not 
extinguish one already operative, and (ii) would generate, or not 
extinguish, a preference that S perform A in those subjects who 
would have the same overriding preference as S (positive, 
negative or none) regarding S's performing A upon adequately 
considering the elements in such a set. 
In a case where 'S' is replaced by T , the condition, similar to that added in 
T', that the speaker would choose to perform A upon adequately 
considering the matter, is made explicit in clause (i). Clause (ii) concerns 
uses of 'oughtto' to make or entertain claims about what others ought 
overridingly to do where such claims, by their content, are also, if true, 
normative for or relative to the speaker himself. Thus, the truth and/or 
felicity of an unqualified assertion by SI that another, S2, o u g h t ^ to 
perform a certain action A, presupposes that both agents would 
prefer/choose that S2 perform A upon their adequately considering the 
matter. Where SI knows or believes that this does not hold of S2, he would 
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not felicitously express his own normative judgment by using 'ought© in a 
third-person judgment about S2. Rather, this he might do using a token of 
the form, "It would be good* I perhaps best*! were S2 not to perform A". 
In T and T©' , and by implication, T and T © , the fol lowing 
subdefinitions (and added explications) also hold: 
(a) By a "condition holding with respect to" a thing or action X, 1 mean 
anything which can be represented as a condition so holding. 
There is no restriction here to "properties," either intrinsic or relational. 
Literally any fact that might be expressed in a 'that'-clause, with or without 
perceptual exemplars incorporated by reference, may consti tute a 
condition in this sense, for example, 'that X exists in a universe in which 
grass is sometimes green'. Further, the phrase, 'can be represented', is to 
be understood independently of epistemic considerations. A fact or 
condition C is rcpresentable, in the limit, by an agent S if it is logically 
possible that there obtain further conditions such that (1) their obtaining 
neither logically implies nor postulates any changes in the motivations or 
motivational capacities of S that would not arise contingently owing to the 
process of the adequate consideration of fact, and (2) subjunctive 
conditionals of the form, "Were S to represent C, then...", would not fail to 
have a truth value in cases where its antecedent docs not obtain, i.e., where 
the conditional is a counterfactual, because the antecedent docs not 
obtain. 
(b) A "(minimal) cvaluatively complete set" of conditions holding with 
respect to a thing or action X is a (possibly empty) set L of 
conditions, G|...C n , such that 
(1) X satisfies the conditions in L; 
(2) X satisfies no further condition d such that adequate 
consideration of d together with the elements of L would alter the 
category of motivation (re T ) or the decision or preference (re T©') 
that would be caused by or remain after adequate consideration 
of the elements of L alone; and 
(3) no proper subset of L satisfies clause (2). 
Implicitly, sets of conditions that are "evaluatively complete" may differ 
relative to different agents or even the same agent at different times. 
With respect to a single agent, there may be more than one such set 
holding with respect to the same thing at the same time. 
Clause (3) in (b) explicates the qualifier, 'minimal', in the phrase 
'minimal cvaluatively complete set'. Under (3), every clement in the set is 
necessary for that set's being evaluatively complete, i.e., for its satisfying 
clauses (1) and especially (2) of (b). Without (3), cvaluatively complete sets 
might, indeed all would, contain all manner of motivationally and/or 
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normatively irrelevant facts with no finite upper bound. Clause (3) 
eliminates such irrelevancies and is therefore useful in defining the 
notion, under T and T©', of a justificatory reason, viz., a good reason 
(relative to an agent or class o f agents) for doing or being positively 
inclined toward a thing is any fact expressed by any element in one or 
more minimal evaluatively complete sets holding, on the one hand, with 
respect to that agent or class, and on the other, the thing in question. On 
this showing, a good/sound justificatory reason is any fact that could form 
an element in a rationally conclusive case for being positively motivated 
toward or actual ly doing a certain thing. In the limit, as also 
parenthetically indicated in (b), such sets may be empty. This could occur 
where an agent already has s o m e positive intrinsic motivation or 
preference for a thing at the time 'good*' or 'ought©' is applied to it. If 
there is nothing about the thing the adequate consideration of which by 
him would alter this, then the null set is a minimal evaluatively complete 
set with respect to the thing and agent in question. 
Two further points about T and T©' should be made. First, a number 
of the complexities involved are needed to avoid a standard objection to 
simple-minded subjectivist accounts of value on which, for example, 'X is 
good' is equivalent to i (the speakerl like X'. On this showing, if SI claims 
that X is good, while S2 asserts that it is not the case that X is good, they 
cannot be contradicting each other in the sense that they are advancing 
logically inconsistent claims. On the present theory, it is possible, though 
not logically guaranteed, that if SI asserts a token of the form, "X is good*", 
and S2 one of the form, "It is not the case that X is good*", the propositions 
expressed by these tokens are indeed logically inconsistent. Thi* vould be 
the case if in fact it is true that SI and S2 would have the same (type of) 
motivation toward X upon their both adequately considering it. 
Finally, while there is not space here to argue or explain this in detail, I 
think that T and T©' embody a number of advantages over their cognitive 
naturalist competitors. For example, both Falk and Railton, op. cit., leave 
out much needed detail in their accounts, respectively, of "merit" and "an 
agent's good." Moreover, both require that an agent (actually or 
hypothctically) achieve near omniscience. Not only is this unnecessary, 
for example, in that it suggests that all facts are relevant to every 
normative or evaluative question, but is theoretically problematic as well. 
Subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents may well lack truth 
values. But the counterfactual supposit ion, "Were S to consider 
everything, then...", is just such an antecedent, no matter what claim about 
S's motivations appears in the consequent. Under T and T©', however, 
omniscience is not required in every or in any case, and minimal 
evaluatively complete sets clearly can have finitely many, indeed none or 
few, elements. Hence, my account does not require that the infinitary 
aspects of things be duplicated in cognition. 
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Brandt's account of "rational desire" and "fully rational action," in 
Brandt, op. cit., while fairly detailed, builds into these notions too much 
epistcmic baggage, limiting what an agent is (hypothetically) required to 
consider to all relevant information epistemically warranted or "available" 
in the agent's society. Two glaring problems with this are, first, that one (or 
we) could sensibly undertake to increase the odds of doing what is "fully 
rational," the strongest normative concept in Brandt's arsenal, by stopping 
the advance of inquiry across the board, thus stabilizing and limiting 
"available" information so that one has a better chance o f taking its 
measure in the process of "cognitive psychotherapy." Second, available 
information not only can include, for Brandt, inaccurate and false 
"information," but such information about a thing might be the only 
motivationally relevant information that is available! Thus, on his view, 
what one ought to do may be entirely a function of beliefs that do not 
reflect reality. 
What is motivating Brandt here is likely the idea, certainly correct, 
that it can sometimes be epistemically rational to accept propositions 
which are in fact false (but never under that description!), and hence that it 
can be rational to act on them and so perform an action even though one 
is in fact laboring under misconceptions about the alternatives in question. 
That there is such a thing as rationality even though one has false or 
inadequate information is not at issue here. That we have need for such a 
notion, or even variants of it - for why is what it is in that sense rational to 
do always necessarily a function of all available information in society? - is 
clear. But there are stronger notions, those expressed by T' and Tm', on 
which it is not a tautology that the point of attempting to be fully rational in 
normative matters is to maximize one's chances of doing what one ought 
overridingly to do. 
